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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
By far the most important development during the survey
period was the adoption by the General Convention of Justices
and Judges of several new rules which should drastically alter
pre-trial practice in the circuit courts. Meeting on May 8, 1969,
and acting pursuant to Section 10-16 of the S.C. Code,1 the cir-
cuit court judges and the justices of the supreme court adopted
seven new circuit court rules, numbered 43, 44, 45, 46, 87, 88,
and 89.2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure served as a
model and these new South Carolina rules are very nearly
identical to their counterparts in the Federal Rules. This action
represents the partial culmination of a movement begun in 1959
by persons interested in seeing South Carolina practice become
more modem and efficient.3 While not all of the Federal Rules
were adopted, those which were are among the most important
and at the same time most controversial.
No general discussion of the rules will be attempted herein.
An excellent short outline is to be found in the July 1969
Trancrpt.4 Rather than duplicate Mr. McKay's work therein,
this article will attempt to point out some of the more important
instances where the South Carolina rules diverge from their
federal models. Generally, the differences are few in number
and of little significance, and reference may be made to the
wealth of material available on the construction of the federal
rules.5
The most important differences are these: none of the seven
new rules provides for the physical examination of a party or
1. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10.16 (1962). This statute sets out the method for
making of the circuit court rules.
2. The rules which up until now were numbered 43, 44, 45, and 46 were
completely rescinded. The new rules numbered 43, 44, 45, and 46 bear no
resemblance to the old ones. The text of the new rules may be found in
Smith's Advance Sheet Number 19 (May 17, 1969) as well as the July 1969
issue of Transcript.
3. H1203, General Assembly of South Carolina (1959). The Judicial
Council draft of the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, modeled after the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was given printer's number 102H and read
for the first time on Feb. 11, 1959. The rules were of course not enacted.
The actual work was begun earlier than 1959 by Professors Randall and Sloan
of the University of South Carolina Law School.
4. McKay, A New State Judicial Conference And New Rules, TRAN-
SCRIPT, July 1969, at 5.
5. W. BARRON & A. HOLTzOFF, FEDEaAL PACrICE AN]D PRCDURE (Rules
Ed. 1960) and J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1968) among other works,
have been helpful to this writer. The decisions of the federal courts and of
states having rules similar to the federal ones are also good authorities.
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witness,6 nor for the taking of testimony by written interroga-
tories.7 These two devices have no doubt at times been abused in
the federal courts. Therefore, the provisions were deleted,
probably for the better.
Ti NEw Cmcoun CourT Rtruis
Rule 43
New Rule 43,8 "A Rule Providing for Pre-Trial Conferences,"
is intended to facilitate simplification of issues, amendment of
pleadings, securing admissions of fact and genuineness of docu-
ments in order to avoid unnecessary proof, limiting the number
of witnesses, and all other matters to speed the disposition of a
court action. The pre-trial conference is not designed to take
the place of a trial: rather it is a means whereby the actual trial
may be conducted more efficiently.9
The wording of its introduction and five enumerated parts is
identical to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
But Rule 43 has notably omitted part of the Federal Rule: the
provision concerning a pre-trial order following the conference.
That omitted part is as follows:
The court shall make an order which recites the action
taken at the conference, the amendments allowed to the
pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as to
any of the matters considered, and which limits the
issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or
agreements of counsel; and such order when entered
controls the subsequent course of the action, unless
modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice ...
There seems to be no good reason for having omitted this section
for without the order there will be difficulty in determining
exactly what was achieved at the conference.
The comments to Rule 16 of the Judicial Council Draft,0
which did include the omitted section, described the potential
use of the rule in the South Carolina circuits as follows:
6. F.R. Civ. P. 35.
7. F.R. Civ. P. 31, 33.
8. S.C. CIp. CT. R. 43. The new rules became effective June 1, 1969.
9. IA W. BARRON & A. HOLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(Rules Ed. 1960) § 471-73; Kincaid, 4 Audgex Handbook of Pre-Trial Pro-
cedure, 17 F.R.D. 439 (1955); C. WRIGHT, LAw OF Fmmu COURTS § 91, at
348 (1963).
10. H1203, supra note 3.
1969]
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The problem of the traveling judge hampers somewhat
the usefulness of this Rule in South Carolina, but it
has been tested to a considerable extent under the gen-
eral powers of the court by several State Circuit Judges,
all of whom state that they found it most desirable. It
has been found possible to apply the rule in at least
three situations: (a) by the resident judge prior to trial
of matters within his own circuit, or prior to an order of
reference; (b) by the presiding judge in those circuits
where he will preside for more than one term during a
fall or winter series, enabling him to hold pre-trial con-
ferences several weeks prior to an ensuing term; (c) by
request of the parties prior to a term during a preceding
general sessions court term, or at the county of residence
of the judge prior to the common pleas term.
Further comparison of Rule 43 to Federal Rule 16 also reveals
two other differences. The federal rule allows the limitation
of the number of expert witnesses, while the South Carolina rule
allows the limitation of the number of total witnesses, expert
and other. Also, Rule 43 makes no specific provision for the
appointment of a master, as does the federal rule.
Rule 44
The primary purpose of the "Rule for Summary Judgment" is
to strike down sham allegations, leaving only the genuine issues
for trial. While the burden is initially upon the moving party,
the court may award a summary judgment to whichever party
is successful in establishing that there is no issue as to the facts,
and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."1
Rule 44 is for the most part identical to Federal Rule 56.
Among the differences is the rigid requirement of the South
Carolina rule that a party asserting a claim must wait 20 days
after the commencement of the action before moving pursuant
to the rule, while one against whom a claim is made may move
for summary judgment at any time. Federal Rule 56 relaxes this
20-day waiting period and allows a claimant to move for sum-
mary judgment in the event that an adverse party makes a
motion for summary judgment within that period. This differ-
ence should not prove decisive, however, for the party moved
against not only may but muswt take immediate action in order
11. Commercial Credit Corp. v. California Shipbldg. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 937
(S.D. Cal. 1947).
[Vol. 21
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to establish that his case needs to go to trial.12 Because the court
may render a favorable verdict for any party, a claimant may
conceivably win a summary judgment within 20 days, although
he may not make the motion within that time.
Federal Rule 56 allows the court to consider among other
things "answers to interrogatories or admissions on file" when
evaluating a motion for summary judgment. Rule 44 does
not include these two sources of information. Because the con-
vention did not adopt a rule similar to the Federal Rules 31 and
34, there will be no interrogatories to consider and the omission
of "answers to interrogatories" is understandable. However,
Rule 89, which allows one party to require another party
to admit the truth of matters or the genuineness of documents,
was adopted. It is difficult to imagine why admissions given
under Rule 89 should not be available for consideration for the
purposes of summary judgment. This would appear to be the
effect of the deletion of this part of the federal rule.
The South Carolina rule also requires the notice of motion to
state the grounds for the motion, which is not true in Federal
Rule 56. This was probably added to insure that the court will be
aware of the exact reasons why a party feels entitled to a
summary judgment.
No counterpart for Federal Rule 56(d) is to be found in the
South Carolina rule. Had this been adopted, a kind of partial
summary judgement would have been available to the circuit
courts. In the federal system, after the court has considered the
pleadings and evidence before it and has interrogated counsel,
it makes an order setting out the facts which it feels are not
controverted. At trial these matters are deemed established, and
the trial is conducted accordingly.
Part (e) of Rule 44 provides for a rather liberal use of con-
tinuances or other orders "[wihenever it appears necessary to the
Court . . . ." While Federal Rule 56(f) also allows continu-
ances, the South Carolina counterpart achieves the same result
without attempting to suggest the situations where this action
is proper.
Rule 45
Rule 45 governs the taking of a voluntary nonsuit by a plain-
tiff. Other than the requirement that notice of dismissal not
12. S.C. CnL CT. R. 44(d).
1969]
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only be filed but served, it is identical to Federal Rule 41(a).
The rest of that federal rule concerns the following: involuntary
dismissals; dismissals of counterclaims, cross-claims or third-
party claims; and costs for previously dismissed actions.
The new state rule allows a plaintiff to dismiss without leave
of court and without prejudice so long as this is done early in
the proceedings. There is no danger that a plaintiff will use
harassing tactics, repeatedly bringing and dismissing actions,
for the rule precludes a plaintiff from bringing the same claim
more than twice. Dismissals late in the proceedings are per-
mitted only with leave of court, and it is within the court's
perogative to dismiss with prejudice.
Rule 46
In the event that parties wish to waive trial by jury, they may
do so under Rule 46, which sets out the procedure to be followed.
This provision is unique amongst the new rules for it is not
modeled after a federal rule. Federal Rule 3813 requires that one
request a trial by jury or this right is waived. By making it
necessary to request a trial by the court, Rule 46 eliminates the
possibility of an accidental waiver of trial by jury.
Rule 87
South Carolina Rule 87 is a composite of Federal Rules 26,
30, and 87. References to admiralty claims have been deleted and
the part of the rule concerning depositions of prisoners has been
reworded so as to conform to the structure of the South Carolina
penal system. The rule also requires that the deposition of a
witness be taken only in the county where he resides, unless
the court orders otherwise. While under the federal rules the
deposition of a witness may be taken several times, Rule 87
permits only one deposition. But more depositions may be taken
if counsel, acting for their parties, agree or if the court allows it
after a showing of good cause. In many cases one opportunity
to depose will be sufficient. If not, there should be no difficulty
in obtaining a second opportunity, either by showing good cause
or by a simple agreement with the other counsel. Also, virtually
the same protection is to be found under Section 11(1) of Rule
87, whereby a party or witness may request the court to order the
deposition not to be taken. These two features of Rule 87 should
serve to quiet the fears of those who anticipated abuse of the rule.
13. F.R. Civ. P. 38(b) & (d).
[Vol. 21
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The protective devices available under Federal Rule 30 are
carried over with few changes into the South Carolina rule.
Rule 87(H) (1) does not retain that part of Rule 30(b) which
allows depositions to be sealed and opened only upon order of
the court, or the protection for trade secrets, or the simultaneous
exchange of sealed envelopes containing specified documents,
not to be opened until so ordered.
Rule 87(7) (b), derived from Federal Rule 37(b) (1) and
37 (b) (2) (iii), lists the sanctions which may be imposed by the
court upon a party or witness who refuses to obey a discovery
order. The South Carolina circuit courts have three fewer alter-
native sanctions available than do the federal district courts: they
cannot rule the subject sought to be discovered to be taken as
established in favor of the party attempting discovery; they
cannot limit the refusing party's attempts to support, oppose, or
introduce evidence regarding a certain claim; and they are not
specifically empowered to order the arrest of the reluctant in-
dividual. They presumably may order arrest by ruling the in-
dividual in contempt of court, however.
Extensive use of the discovery capability made available in
Rule 87 in actions where a relatively small amount is in con-
troversy would cause an unnecessary drain on an attorney's
most precious resource, time. For this reason $10,000 is the
minimum amount which must be in controversy before Rule 87
may be utilized. Exceptions are allowed if the parties or counsel
agree or if the court so orders. This is an excellent provision
and illustrates the concern of the courts for the practical prob-
lems of the attorney.
It is of no little significance that the drafters did not include
within the rules themselves any protection for what has come
to be known as the attorney's "work product." The federal rules
similarly have no such protection written in, but protection is
provided by the rationale of the often cited case of Hickman v.
Taylor.14 Some other states which have adopted rules based on
the federal rules have chosen to include protection for the "work
product" within the body of the rules themselves.15 Because the
new discovery rules did not deal with the question, one can only
14. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
15. Silverstein, Adoption of the Federal Rides of Discovery in State Prac-
tice, 11 KAN. L. REv. 213 (1962). This artcile lists some of the states which
have codified work product protection. Not all have approached the problem
in the same manner, but the common goal for most has been to create a
facsimile of Hickman v. Taylor.
19691
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assume that either the rationale of Hickman v. Taylor will come
to be applied or the state will develop its own standard of
protection.
Rule 88
Rule 88, derived from Federal Rule 34, adds the requirement
that 10 days notice must be given to all other parties before the
discovery commences. Federal Rule 34 specifically incorporates
by reference the protections set out in Federal Rule 30(b),16 but
this feature was not carried over into Rule 88. The omission
must have been intentional, for, if the format of the other rules
is any indication, had the protections been meant to have been
included, most of the text of 30(b) would have been placed at
the point where the federal rule parallels 30(b); at least H(1)
of South Carolina Rule 87 would have been incorporated by
reference. This was not done. It therefore must be assumed
that whatever protection from Rule 88 discovery is to be forth-
coming must be based on the last phrase of Rule 88, that the
court "may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just"
for the utilization of the rule. Also, Rule 88 requires that the
court be convinced that there is a good cause for the use of the rule
before discovery purusant to it is to be allowed. Because no
court would permit the rule to be used if it sensed possible
abuse, the omission should be without consequence. Other than
these two minor variations, Rule 88 is copied verbatim from
Federal Rule 34.
Rule 89
Rule 89 was created by combining Federal Rules 36 and 37 (c),
with minor alterations. Rule 89 requires leave of court if the
request is made within 20 days while the federal rule requires
that leave be given if the request is made within 10 days. The
South Carolina rule also specifically provides that an admis-
sion made as a result of Rule 89 may not be used in any other
proceeding, civil or criminal. The consequences for making a
party prove what he requested to be admitted are found in
Federal Rule 37(c). These consequences are mirrored in Rule
87(c).
16. The court, after a showing of good cause, may order that the deposition
not be taken, or that it may be taken only at some designated place other than
the one stated in the notice. It may order the deposition to be taken only by
the use of written interrogatories, or it may limit the scope of the examination
or the matters which may be inquired into. Rule 30(b) sets out protections
not listed here. All are designed to prevent abuse of discovery.
[Vol. 21
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CASES
A. Rules Construed
In Jones v. Dague, 17 the defendants attempted to argue that
the South Carolina practice of not allowing the life expectancy
of a beneficiary in a wrongful death action to be taken into
account is unsound and not in accord with the weight of author-
ity. The court conceded that there was some doubt as to the
soundness of the rule. Nevertheless it allowed plaintiff the bene-
fit of stare decisis because the defendant had not followed the
procedure set out in Rule 8, Section 10.18 The rule directs that
permission must be asked before argument can be directed
against a standing case.
Rule 4, Section 6 of the Supreme Court Rules,19 governing
the assignment of error, is not in every case strictly adhered to
by the supreme court, as was shown in State v. Funderburke.20
The appellant had been convicted of rape, and sought a new
trial on the basis of alleged prejudicial error in the admission
into evidence of a coat and mask. These, the court held, were
clearly the product of an illegal search and their admission into
evidence should not have been allowed in view of Mapp v.
Ohio.21 While the exception was not drafted in strict compliance
with the rule, the court considered the case to be of such gravity,
and the error in the lower court to be so patent, that a refusal
to honor it would not have been justified merely on the basis of
form. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
17. 166 S.E.2d 99 (S.C. 1969), further discussed in the Survey of Appcal.
18. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 8(10):
Counsel desiring to attack or argue against a decision of this
Court, with a view to asking the Court to review, modify, or
overrule the same, must petition the Court in writing, at least
four days before the call of the case in which such argument is
sought to be made, asking permission to do so, and set forth the
reasons why the decisions in question should be reviewed, modi-
fied or overruled.
19. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4(6):
Each exception must contain a concise statement of one proposition
of law or fact which this Court is asked to review, and the same
assignment of error should not be repeated. Each exception must
contain within itself a complete assignment of error, and a mere
reference therein to any other exception then or previously taken,
or request to charge will not be considered. The exceptions should
not be long or argumentative in form.
20. 164 S.E.2d 309 (S.C. 1968).
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also State v. Hill, 245 S.C. 76, 138 S.E.2d
829 (1964).
19691
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B). Venue
In Lott v. Glauses,m2 2 the unqualified right to use bread
racks was held to be sufficient property, within the meaning of
Section 10-421, 23 for the purpose of sustaining venue. Claussen's
admitted transacting business within Barnwell County, but ap-
pealed the lower court's ruling that it owned property within
that county. Certain bread racks situated in various grocery
stores within the county, although not owned by Claussen's, were
owned by the South Carolina Bakers Council, an eleemosynary
corporation of which Claussen's was a dues-paying member. The
racks were provided by the council for the exclusive use of its
members.
In PelZ v. Ball,24 the court long ago defined property for the
purpose of determining venue as "a general term to designate
the right of ownership; and [one which] includes every subject,
of whatever nature, upon which such a right can legally attach."
The court has also held that contract rights, more specifically
insurance contracts25 and extermination contracts, 26 were prop-
erty for the purpose of establishing venue. Claussen's, by virtue
of its membership in the council, had a legally enforceable right
to the use of the racks, and had enjoyed this right for some time.
The court thought this right to exclusive use to be closely akin
to the rights conferred in the above mentioned contracts, which
had been treated as property. For this reason it held that Claus-
sen's did own property as contemplated by Section 10-421, and
that this, plus the admitted transaction of business, was sufficient
to sustain venue.
In another case involving venue, Buvr-is Chemical Co. v. Daniel
Construction Co.,2 7 the court upheld the lower court's refusal to
honor Daniel's "objection to jurisdiction." Prior to the commence-
ment by Burris of an action for declaratory judgment, brought in
Colleton County, Daniel had filed a mechanic's lien on a York
County plant site belonging to Burris. Subsequent to the com-
mencement of the Colleton County action, Daniel began fore-
closure proceedings on this lien. It was argued on behalf of
22. 251 S.C. 478, 163 S.E.2d 615 (1968). This decision is further com-
mented upon in the Survey of Appeal.
23. S.C. CODE ANx. § 10-421 (1962).
24. Speer's Eq. 48, 83 (1843).
25. Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, Inc., 202 S.C. 304, 24 S.E.2d 513
(1943).
26. Peeples v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 244 S.C. 173, 135 S.E.2d 845 (1964).
27. 251 S.C. 483, 163 S.E.2d 618 (1968).
[Vol. 21
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Daniel that this action in York County divested the Colleton
Court of its jurisdiction.
The supreme court noted that South Carolina's venue statute
provides that actions involving real estate should be tried in the
county where the land is located,28 and also that mechanics' liens
are to be enforced in the court of common pleas where the build-
ing or land is situated.29 In spite of this the court declined to
rule that the Colleton County court had been divested of its
jurisdiction. Daniel was instead instructed to seek a change of
venue in the event that the case did not proceed to final ad-
judication in Colleton County.
The fact that two actions were pending in two different courts
had not been before the lower court and thus the issue was not
properly before the supreme court. The matter was left open for
settlement by the two courts involved.
C. Service of Process and Jurisdietion
The court ruled in Buwris Chemical Co. v. Daniel Construction
Co.,03 supra, that service upon a supervisor in charge of 16 men
at a construction site in Colleton County met the requisites of
South Carolina's service of process statute.31 Such service did
give notice to the corporation of the proceedings against it.
It cannot be logically argued that the superintendent in
charge of all of the remaining employees at a project
of this magnitude [between $400,000 and $600,000 esti-
mated cost] is not such a representative of the corpora-
tion as contemplated by the legislature to apprise the
corporation that an action had been commenced ....
[The service could reasonably be expected to result in
prompt notice to the corporation with adequate oppor-
tunity to defend. 2
The court also held that Daniel was transacting business as
contemplated by Section 10-421. Atkinson v. Korn,33 where a
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-301 (1962) :
[Tihat, in the case of domestic or foreign corporations, service
as effected under the terms of this section shall be effective
and confer jurisdiction over any domestic or foreign corporation
in any county where such domestic or foreign corporation shall
own property and transact business, regardless of whether or not
such domestic corporation maintains an office or has agents in
that county. (Emphasis added.)
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45.264 (1962).
30. 251 S.C. 483, 163 S.E.2d 618 (1968).
31. S.C.CODE ANN. § 10-421 (1962).
32. 251 S.C. 483, 478, 163 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1968).
33. 219 S.C. 102, 65 S.E.2d 465 (1951).
1969]
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logging contract was held to be "transacting business", was
considered as controlling rather than Seegers v. WIS-TV, 3 4 and
Thomas c& Toward Ca. v. Marion Lumber Co.,3 5 which had in-
volved only occasional solicitation and deliveries within the
county.
The property requirement of Section 10-421 was said to have
been met by the presence at the construction site of a mobile
office trailer and various pieces of construction equipment. The
court considered the facts of the present case dissimilar to those
in two cases argued on behalf of Daniel Construction, where the
"property" had been within a county only while in transit.
In Ballew v. Ballew,36 it was held that service of process had
been made upon the nonresident members of a partnership by
the delivery of a summons and complaint to an employee at the
partnership's place of business in South Carolina. The defend-
ants contended that Section 10-43837 did not authorize such sub-
stituted service upon an employee. The court disagreed, and
explained that
[w]hile the presence of a defendant within the State is
required in order to make Section 10-438 available, this
does not necessarily mean physical presence. Under the
statute a defendant is present within the State when
he . . . (2) has a place of residence or business within
the State, in which event substituted service may be had
on a person of discretion residing at the place of busi-
ness.38
In Ballew the defendants had stipulated that they transacted
business and maintained an office within the state. This was
34. 236 S.C. 355, 114 S.E.2d 502 (1960).
35. 232 S.C. 304, 101 S.E.2d 848 (1958).
36. 251 S.C. 496, 163 S.E.2d 622 (1968).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-438 (1962):
In all cases other than those mentioned in this article the sum-
mons shall be served by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant
personally or to any person of discretion residing at the residence
or employed at the place of business of the defendant.
38. 251 S.C. 496, 499, 163 S.E.2d 622, 623-24 (1968). In Armstrong v.
Brant, 44 S.C. 177, 21 S.E. 634 (1895), the court did not uphold service
made upon a relative of the defendant, although of adequate discretion, because
the person served was not within the state. In Brays Island Plantation, Inc.
v. Harper, 245 S.C. 399, 140 S.E.2d 781 (1965), there was an unsuccessful
attempt to serve an agent, only temporarily within the state, whose employer
had no place of business within the state. § 10-438 has been held to include
nonresidents as well as residents. Ford v. Calhoun, 53 S.C. 106, 30 S.E. 830
(1898).
[Vol. 21
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sufficient presence, for the reasons given by the court above, to
make service upon the employee proper.
Carnie v. Carnie39 raised the question of the validity of con-
structive service of process by mail upon a nonresident defend-
ant in a divorce action. The plaintiff-respondent sought a di-
vorce after four years of legal separation. At the time of the
commencement of the action her husband was stationed in Iran
and had no property within the state. While the actual decree
of divorce was not contested by the husband, it was argued on
his behalf that the lower court had erroneously denied his motion
to strike those provisions of the decree relating to alimony,
attorney's fees, and child support. The appeal was brought on
the issue of lack of in personam jurisdiction, which jurisdiction
the appellant argued was necessary for the provisions in ques-
tion, and which he argued had not been obtained by the at-
tempted service by mail.
The court noted, without so holding, that it was doubtful
whether such constructive service on a nonresident was sufficient
for any of the provisions of the divorce decree. The court did
not so hold because it feared that one of the parties might have
relied to his detriment upon the decree by the lower court. The
court did specifically hold that such service was insufficient to
bestow upon the lower court the necessary in personam juris-
diction to award the alimony, child support or attorney's fees. 40
D. Pleadings
In Wilson v. American Casualty Co.,41 the plaintiff had in
the lower court succeeded in an attempt to recover from the
insurance company mortgage payments past due under a disabil-
ity insurance policy and also the amounts expended for at-
torney's fees in prior suits for the same purpose. The defendant
was unable to secure reversal of the lower court's refusal to
exclude parts of the plaintiff's pleadings. These parts made
reference to the prior actions and past difficulty the plaintiff
had had with the insurance company. The supreme court did
agree, however, that the attorney's fees for those earlier actions
were not connected with the present claim, and ordered the
39. 167 S.E2d 297 (S.C. 1969).
40. Id. Had the defendant owned land within the state, that land could have
been subjected to the payment of alimony, for such an action would have been
an action in rem, for which no personal service is necessary.
41. 166 S.E.2d 797 (S.C. 1969).
1969]
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admitted amount of those fees eliminated from the judgment.
The court left open the question of whether those fees could be
recovered in an appropriate action.
E. Declaratory Judgment
In Park- v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Amerla,4 2 Park sought a
declaratory judgment to determine whether Safeco had success-
fully denied having coverage of McCall, a tort-feasor in an acci-
dent with Park. If so, Southern Home Insurance Co., Park's own
insurer, was liable to him pursuant to the Uninsured Motorist
Law.43 McCall was not a party to the declaratory judgment
action. Plaintiff no doubt merely hoped to determine the proper
source to which to look for the recovery of the damages resulting
from the accident.
The South Carolina Supreme Court refused to overrule the
lower court's decision sustaining the defendant's demurrer, pri-
marily because the question of McCall's liability had not been
established. The heart of the court's opinion is the statement
that "there is presently between plaintiff and Safeco no justicia-
ble issue ripe for judicial pronouncement, because the possible
issues are not sufficiently immediate and real to warrant action
by the court."
44
The court disagreed with the plaintiff's contention that an
injured party ought to have the right to have the validity of the
tort-feasor's insurance policy determined. That party would
have standing to request such a determination only after the
question of liability between himself and the tort-feasor was
determined.
F. Motion to Strike
In Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenvmille, Ino.45 the circuit court
refused to grant the defendant's motion to strike portions of an
amended complaint when the motion was made four days before
a scheduled retrial. In the original trial the plaintiff had sued
on two causes of action: abuse of process and malicious prosecu-
tion. The jury found for the plaintiff on the former and for the
defendant on the latter. On appeal, the supreme court reversed
42. 251 S.C. 410, 162 S.E2d 709 (1968).
43. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 47-750.33 (Supp. 1968).
44. 251 S.C. 410, 415, 162 S.E2d 709, 711 (1968).
45. 166 S.E.2d 297 (S.C. 1969).
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and remanded for a new trial on only the cause of action for
abuse of process. Five days prior to the second trial the de-
fendant sought to have the plaintiff amend his complaint to
delete all references to the cause of action for malicious prosecu-
tion, which had already been decided in favor of the defendant.
The plaintiff served his amended complaint four days prior to
the tentative date for trial, and the defendant moved to have
striken, as provided in Circuit Court Rule 20,46 parts of the
complaint which he argued were pertinent only to an action for
malicious prosecution. The circuit court refused to honor this
motion.
The supreme court held that the letter as well as the spirit of
Rule 20 precluded the granting of this particular motion due to
the time at which it was made. The court pointed out that the
case had been remanded on March 23, 1967 and that it had not
been scheduled to come to trial before June 5, 1967. The defend-
ant had known throughout this period the contents of the
original complaint as to the single cause of action remaining.
Had he had objections to any portion of that complaint, the
proper action would have been to move promptly to have them
striken and not to wait until the eve of the trial to do so.
The lower court and supreme court were also in agreement in
their construction of Section 10-629, 47 which details the pro-
cedure for various amendments. The plaintiff had been allowed
to amend his complaint at the conclusion of argument so that it
coincided with facts brought out during the trial. The supreme
court concluded that this did not substantially change the com-
plaint, that it did not state a new and independent cause of
action, and that it did not surprise the defendant. Thus the
amendment was held to be a proper exercise of discretion by the
trial judge.
G. Res Judicata
In BeZZ v. Boyd,48 the court followed the general rule "that
a judgment rendered by reason of defective pleadings is not con-
46. S.C. CIm CT. R. 20 provides:
Motions to strike out of any pleading matter alleged to be irrele-
vant or redundant, and motions to correct a pleading on the ground
of its being 'so indefinite or uncertain that the precise nature of
the charge or defense is not apparent,' must be noticed before
demurring or answering the pleading, and within twenty days from
the service thereof.
47. S.C. CoDE A-,qN. § 10-629 (1962).
48. 166 S.E.2d 104 (S.C. 1969).
1969]
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sidered on the merits within the operation of the doctrine of
res judicata." 40 The case arose when Bell brought an action for
a declaratory judgment to determine the rights of the parties
with respect to two tracts of land. Boyd asserted the defense
of res judicata, citing an earlier injunctive action in the Court
of Common Pleas involving herself and a party different from
the present plaintiff, and successfully moved for judgment on
the pleadings.
The supreme court concluded that there was no identity of
subject matter between the injunctive proceeding and the action
in Bell sufficient for the purposes of res judicata. An analysis
of that action revealed only that "the return had failed to allege
sufficient facts to constitute a defense."50 There was no need to
determine precisely what had been adjudicated previously, it
being sufficient for the court to decide "that the precise issues
involved in this case were not adjudicated on the merits in the
former proceeding." '51 Therefore, the lower court was reversed.
In the second case surveyed involving res judicata, McConnell
v. Williams, 2 the committee for a person non compos mentis
sought an order directing the defendant to give an accounting
for rents and profits and to reconvey some parcels of land to
the ward of the committee. Without waiting for this litigation
to be concluded the committee brought a second action, this one
in tort, seeking actual and punitive damages for breach of
contract to collect rents and for wrongful appropriation of
money due the committee's ward.
When the defendant Williams filed an accounting in connec-
tion with the first action, the trial court neither approved nor
disapproved it but in effect continued the proceedings so that the
committee could examine its contents. Later, at the defendant's
request, the court issued an order dealing with both the original
accounting action and the subsequent tort suit: the court en-
listed a referee to evaluate the accounting and abated the tort
action. The committee, thinking its $175,000 tort claim jeopar-
dized by the abatement, appealed.
The supreme court noted language in the trial court's order
characterizing the suits as closely related, then agreed with com-
49. Id. at 106, citing 30A Am. .TuR. JTudgments § 351 (1958).
50. 166 S.E.2d at 106.
51. Id. See generally Whetsell v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 188 S.C. 106,
198 S.E. 153 (1938) ; Roberts v. Jones, 71 S.C. 404, 51 S.E. 240 (1905) ; Gist
v. Davis, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill's Eq.) 335 (1835).
52. 167 S.E.2d 429 (S.C. 1969).
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mittee's counsel that the actions were not absolutely identical.
Conceding the fact that abatement is usually appropriate only
when parties, causes of action, issues, and relief sought are identi-
cal - which here they were not - the court nevertheless affirmed
the abatement of the tort claim. Justice Littlejohn, speaking for
the court, seemed to appreciate the trial court's sensible solution
to this unusual problem. Perhaps the nebulous litigation below
did fail to conform to the classic requirements for abatement, 3
yet "the ends of justice [would] be best served by allowing the
first suit to proceed and by withholding action in the second
suit. '54 Furthermore, nothing in the trial court's order precluded
revival of the tort claim at the proper time.
H. Jury Instructions
In Smith v. Winningham,55 the trial judge felt it necessary to
instruct the jury on the standard of care required of a motorist in
an area known to be frequented by children. It was urged on ap-
peal that there was error in a part of these instructions. In an-
swering this contention the supreme court held that no part of
the charge would be read out of context for the purpose of de-
termining error. The charge as a whole was found errorless.
I. ConditionaZ Remission,
The plaintiff's strategy in Sellers v. Sears Roebuce and Co.50
with respect to the use of a conditional remission was thwarted
when the conditions specified in the remission were realized. The
trial judge instructed the plaintiff to remit $1,500 of a $5,000
judgment or have the defendant's motion for a new trial granted.
The plaintiff remitted but attempted to discourage any appeal
by the defendant by conditioning the remission upon the defend-
ant's acceptance of the court's order without appeal and by re-
serving the right also to appeal if the defendant appealed.
The defendant did appeal, and the South Carolina Supreme
Court ruled that this in effect nullified the remission.
We have held that, when a plaintiff fails to remit in ac-
cordance with the order granting a new trial nisi, the
effect of the order is to grant a new trial absolute. When
53. See 1 C.J.S. Abatenent and Revival § 39 (1936) (cited by the court).
54. 167 S.E.2d at 432.
55. 166 S.E.2d 825 (S.C. 1969).
56. 166 S.E2d 1 (S.C. 1969).
1969]
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss4/10
636 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVmW [Vol. 21
defendant appealed, there was no remisioan because the
plaintiff specifically conditioned his acceptance of the
reduction in the amount of the verdict upon the absence
of an appeal by defendant.
57
Plaintiff faced a new trial, the very thing which he had sought
to avoid from the first.
J. Anmilary Jurisdiction
Andrews v. Central Surety Insurance Co.5s presented the fed-
eral district court, Judge Simons sitting, with an interesting
problem of jurisdiction involving contingent fee contracts. An-
drews' insurance companies deposited $160,517.76 into the regist-
ry of the federal court after a jury determined that the com-
panies had acted negligently or in bad faith by not settling a
claim for the wrongful death of Allen T. Green within the limits
of Andrews' liability policy. The wrongful death action, brought
in a South Carolina court, resulted in a judgment $134,000 above
the policy limits. That figure plus interest from the date of judg-
ment plus court costs were deposited with the federal court.
The court offered two alternative plans in an attempt to settle
upon a fee schedule; however, neither of these was suitable to
counsel. At this point spokesmen for all interested attorneys re-
quested that they be allowed to withdraw their petitions, arguing
that all involved were South Carolina residents and for that rea-
son there was not the requisite diversity for jurisdiction.
After stating that research had revealed no case precisely in
point, the court announced that
there is much authority which supports the principle
that once federal jurisdiction has properly attached in
a primary cause of action, the federal court also has an-
cillary jurisdiction over certain subsidiary or subordi-
nate disputes including attorneys fees even though it
might not be independently able to proceed to adjudicate
them.5 9
Once jurisdiction was determined, the court felt compelled to con-
tinue with the case rather than to allow the difficult task of set-
57. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
58. 295 F. Supp. 1223 (D.S.C. 1969).
59. Id. at 1227. The court cited numerous authorities, including WIGHT,
atpra note 9, at § 9.
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tling the disputed fees fall upon a state court which would have
been unfamiliar with the character of the case. 0
K. Miscellaneous
In Williams v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insur-
ance Co."' a new trial was ordered on the basis of errors found
in the admission of testimony in questions put by the trial judge
to a witness, and in part of the plaintiff's counsel's closing argu-
ments alluding to the wealth and evils of insurance companies.
When plaintiff Williams sought recovery on a fire policy car-
ried by Farm Bureau, he also joined as a defendant his lessee,
Hamilton, in order to protect any interest which Hamilton might
have in the same policy. Hamilton, from whom no relief was
sought, thereupon cross claimed against the insurance company.
The cross claim was non-suited, yet Hamilton's attorney remained
active in the case, apparently for the sole purpose of assisting
plaintiff's attorneys.
Neither Williams nor the insurance company called Hamilton
as a witness during the presentation of their cases. His own
counsel called him in reply, however, and following lengthy testi-
mony he was cross-examined by counsel for the defense. A cross-
examination by the plaintiff was also allowed despite defendant's
objections. The trial judge overruled the objection apparently
because he considered Hamilton still to be in the case as a de-
fendant.
The supreme court ruled this cross-examination by counsel for
the plaintiff to be prejudicial error. The court reasoned that in
effect, though not explicitly, Hamilton had already been a wit-
ness for the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff had not actually
called Hamilton as his witness, he became such when called by
his own counsel to testify at length in a fashion favorable to the
plaintiff. The result of all this was that the plaintiff had the
opportunity to cross-examine his own witness.
Reversible error was also found in the trial judge's handling
of questions which he presented to Hamilton. After recognizing
the broad discretion allowed the trial judge in questioning, the
court expressed concern that the form of these questions might
have misled some members of the jury into believing that the
trial judge was of the opinion that the insurance company's
60. See, Bounougias v. Peters, 369 F2d 247 (7th Cir. 1966).
61. 251 S.C. 464, 163 S.E2d 212 (1968).
1969]
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss4/10
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW RIviRVW
agent had not correctly recorded answers given him for the poli-
cy by Hamilton. The court reiterated the necessity for any such
questions to be carefully put so as to avoid any appearance of
partiality. The trial judge
should be cautious to see that such questions are pro-
pounded in a fair and impartial manner, and should not
express or indicate to the jury [his] opinion as to the
facts of the case or the weight or sufficiency of the evi-
dence.
02
Although the record failed to contain the closing argument of
plaintiff's counsel, the court was satisfied that it sounded sub-
stantially like the paraphrase contained in opposing counsel's in-
dignant objection:
[T]he Insurance Company owns the skyscrapers, they
have all the finances and they take money from people
like . .. Charlie Williams. 3
The court was convinced that the argument had been improper
and that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury to
disregard the remarks and in not reprimanding the attorney.
MAsoN A. GoLDSmrrm
62. Id. at 472, 163 S.E.2d at 216. See also State v. Chasteen, 228 S.C. 88,
88 S.E.2d 880 (1955).
63. Id.
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